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Reluctant Partners:  
African Americans and the Origins of the Special Relationship 
 
This article assesses the overwhelmingly negative reaction of African Americans to the 
speech delivered by Winston Churchill in Fulton, Missouri, in March 1947. It shows 
that black intellectuals and activists fervently opposed the Anglo-American alliance 
championed by the former prime minister because they believed it a cynical attempt to 
buttress an exploitative overseas empire that Britain could no longer afford. African 
Americans considered Churchill a racist intent on preserving white global hegemony 
and suppressing the democratic aspirations of people of colour. Despite their initial 
optimism about the Attlee government elected to power in July 1945, they became 
almost as mistrustful of the Labour Party as they did the Conservatives. In 
demonstrating how African Americans considered the Anglo-American alliance to be a 
means of propagating white racism, the article provides a new perspective on grassroots 
resistance to the Special Relationship, emphasising tensions between diplomatic elites 
and ordinary citizens. 
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 John Bull cheerfully strolls along, an insouciant whistle emanating from his lips. 
There is something wrong, however. Look closer, and the ground beneath John’s feet turns 
out not to be made of earth, but of the bodies of Britain’s colonial subjects, bent and broken 
under the weight of his heel. In his hand, he also clutches a briefcase on which are written the 
words ‘Churchill’s Speech’. Underneath the ghastly image is a clearly rhetorical question, 
‘Shall we help to perpetuate this?’ This cartoon, published in the Baltimore Afro-American in 
March 1946, encapsulates the rancorous reaction of many African Americans to the address 
delivered that month by Winston Churchill in Fulton, Missouri, in which Britain’s former 
prime minister claimed that an ‘iron curtain’ had descended across Europe and called for an 
Anglo-American alliance to protect from further Soviet expansionism.1  
The scathing response of African Americans to the Fulton speech provides a new 
perspective on the uncertain evolution of the ‘Special Relationship’ between Britain and the 
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United States. In concentrating on diplomatic elites and to a lesser extent the mainstream 
press, scholars have paid little attention to black voices in transatlantic political dialogue. The 
strength of African American opposition both to the Fulton speech and to proposed US 
financial aid to Britain nonetheless demonstrates the fragility of popular support for the 
nascent Anglo-American alliance. Viewed from a post-Cold War perspective, the Special 
Relationship seems preordained. Yet by resisting the temptation to read history backwards 
and focusing on events and their interpretation at the time, the emergence of the Anglo-
American alliance appears much more contingent. Historians have demonstrated the apathy, 
scepticism and outright hostility on both sides of the Atlantic to Churchill’s speech.2 The 
most clamorous opposition of all came from African Americans and their arguments against 
an alliance with Britain placed far greater emphasis on issues of race and empire.  
Black antipathy focused directly on the personality and politics of Churchill. African 
Americans loathed the former prime minister. That aversion owed to what they believed was 
a racism that had undermined his wartime rhetoric. The Fulton address was, in their opinion, 
a cynical attempt on the part of Britain’s erstwhile prime minister to secure American support 
for the maintenance of an overseas empire that it could no longer afford. Far from protecting 
democracy against the threat posed by the Soviet Union, Churchill’s ulterior motive was to 
re-establish the pre-war global order of white racial supremacy. This distrust of British 
intentions was almost universal among African Americans. Yet while many African 
Americans considered Britain an imperial bully, there was a competing notion of the country 
that commanded considerable currency among black intellectuals and activists. Influenced by 
its long tradition as one of the leading international critics of US racism, some African 
Americans regarded Britain as a force for progressive reform that could prove a powerful 
champion of the post-war civil rights movement. However, neither of these conflicting 
constructions of Britain reconciled African Americans to the nascent Special Relationship. 
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Their profound hostility towards the embryonic Anglo-American alliance demonstrates the 
extent to which it was an elite enterprise rather than an expression of popular will. African 
Americans had little influence over the emergent alliance but that is itself significant. Their 
fundamental lack of cultural or historical affinity with Britain underlines the limitations of the 
Special Relationship as an ideological rather than politically strategic force.  
African American antagonism towards the prospect of an alliance between Britain and 
the United States had its origins in the Second World War. African Americans had by the 
1940s come to believe that their own domestic struggle against racism was closely bound to 
the broader global challenge to western imperialism. Black activists in the United States drew 
a particularly close analogy between Jim Crow practices in their own country and British 
colonial rule in India. According to Max Yergen of the National Negro Congress, ‘The cup 
from which the Indian masses have drunk is also pressed to the lips of Negro Americans and 
its bitter taste lingers. Whether it be discrimination in terms of caste, race or color, the Negro 
people know the sting of the lash which India’s millions have felt.’ For African Americans, 
India was the most important link in the chain connecting the non-white peoples of the world 
in their crusade for democracy and independence. Establishing India’s right to self-
governance would galvanise the nationalist movements across the African continent, the 
spiritual and ancestral homeland of black Americans. As Yergen concluded, ‘Whatever 
advanced policy is put into operation there, is bound to affect other great colonial areas like 
Africa. We Negroes have a deep interest in that continent of our fathers.’ Moreover, the civil 
disobedience tactics used by Gandhi against the British provided inspiration to African 
Americans in their own domestic struggle for the full rights of citizenship.3  
 The wartime rhetoric of Allied leaders gave hope to the global vision of African 
Americans. In August 1941, Churchill and US president Franklin Roosevelt issued the 
Atlantic Charter, a joint declaration of British and American war aims that included the right 
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to self-determination. The Charter raised African American expectations of a new 
commitment by the western powers to promote the dignity and human rights of people 
throughout the world. In their opinion, the Charter compelled the United States to secure the 
social and political rights of its black population at home and Britain to secure self-
government for its colonised subjects abroad. A cartoon by black artist Charles Alston 
captured African Americans’ excited sense of the Atlantic Charter’s historical significance, 
portraying the ghost of Abraham Lincoln standing over Churchill and Roosevelt as they 
signed the document and proclaiming ‘A Second Emancipation Proclamation!!’4  
When Churchill announced to the House of Commons on 9 September 1941 that the 
Charter applied only to the people of Europe living under Nazi occupation, African 
Americans angrily accused him of undermining the cause of freedom and democracy for 
which Allied forces were supposedly fighting.5 At a time when their own government 
moderated its criticism of British imperialism, African Americans were unrestrained in 
condemning Churchill for his selective application of the Charter. In response to the Prime 
Minister’s proclamation that he would not oversee the disintegration of the British Empire, 
the Chicago Defender asserted that, ‘Black America is truly shocked by the bold and brazen 
stand by Churchill. We have never known or believed him a friend but we hoped that he as 
well as the world is learning about democracy from the very “blood sweat and tears” of 
war.’6 
If Churchill’s interpretation of the Atlantic Charter had fuelled the smouldering 
mistrust of African Americans, then the Fulton speech fanned the flames of their anger. For 
black political commentators, the address fortified their conviction that the former prime 
minister was a fanatical imperialist who regarded democracy as the preserve of white 
westerners. African American newspapers collectively interpreted the speech as a cynical 
attempt to perpetuate British imperialism and thereby deny oppressed colonial peoples the 
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freedoms for which they had fought as part of the Allied war effort. In the words of one black 
newspaper, ‘The rule of people by other people is not the freedom that colored peoples, who 
fought with the United Nations, fought to preserve.’7 
The economic ruin suffered by Britain as a result of six years of warfare had rendered 
its empire unsustainable without financial and military support. Rather than admit the end of 
empire, Churchill had, in the opinion of African Americans, resuscitated ideas of transatlantic 
racial kinship in order to pass the financial and military burden of maintaining white global 
supremacy to the American government. The National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) led the chorus of opposition to the speech, reacting furiously to 
what it interpreted as an attempt by the British to re-establish the pre-war imperial order 
through the surrogate rule of the United States.8 Black newspaper columnists sounded the 
same notes of criticism. If Churchill had his way, they concluded, American troops—
including African Americans—would be the ones deployed to suppress nationalist protest in 
Burma, India and Palestine.9 In an admittedly outrageous caricature of British society that 
emphasised class as much as race, black trade union leader Ferdinand C. Smith proclaimed 
that Churchill expected Americans who had ‘just fought a war to destroy fascism and 
tyranny’ to ‘send their sons to die to preserve “prerogative” British lords, dukes and earls, 
still plotting in their many castles to suppress the natural aspirations of the Indian, African, 
Chinese and Indonesian people’.10 Black political leader and polymath W. E. B. Du Bois 
similarly and more succinctly described Churchill’s speech as ‘this siren song of the British 
aristocracy’ luring American soldiers to their deaths in foreign lands.11 
The black press also dismissed Churchill’s rationalisation for an Anglo-American 
alliance as a buttress against the global threat posed by the Soviet Union, regarding this as a 
smokescreen meant to conceal the white supremacist doctrine that underpinned the speech. 
Although Churchill placed his emphasis on the common cultural heritage shared by the 
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peoples of Britain and the United States, African Americans interpreted the Fulton address as 
a brazen rearticulation of the racial Anglo-Saxonism with which the two nations justified 
wars of imperial conquest half a century earlier.12 ‘When Mr. Churchill talks about 
democracy,’ asserted the Los Angeles Sentinel, ‘he means democracy for Europeans or 
descendants of Europeans.’13 Speaking at a meeting of the Council on African Affairs in Los 
Angeles, black artist and activist Paul Robeson similarly alleged that Churchill wanted to 
impose a new white hegemonic order that would render Allied victory a defeat for the 
democratic aspirations of people of colour. The Fulton speech, he concluded, was nothing 
less than an ‘Anglo-Saxon world domination scheme’.14 
The intrinsically racist nature of the speech was a recurring theme of black press 
coverage. Some commentators went so far as to accuse Churchill of having fought the 
Second World War not because he opposed the racial fanaticism of the Nazis but simply to 
remove an imperialist rival to Britain. According to John Robert Badger, the British 
statesman wanted to encourage whites on both sides of the Atlantic to ‘assume the task of 
policing and ordering the entire world to their way of life’. The Union Jack, he concluded, 
was no better than the Swastika. ‘It was Hitler, remember, who promulgated the myth of the 
Aryans as the “chosen people” for such a task. Hitler’s Germans were to do precisely what 
Churchill now urges Britons and Americans to do.’ Writing in the Pittsburgh Courier, black 
author J. A. Rodgers evoked the spectres of domestic and international white supremacy, 
denouncing Churchill for his ‘crazy KuKlux philosophy’ and concluding that ‘though he 
spouts democracy, he is a fascist at heart’.15 In an editorial likening Britain’s wartime leader 
to two of Mississippi’s most notorious white supremacist politicians, the Kansas City 
Plaindealer also concluded that, ‘Hitler was never more bent on white supremacy than 
Churchill and Bilbo and Rankin... The world knows that the greatest difference between the 
living fascists and the dead ones resides in the fact that the dead ones were caught.’16 
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African Americans not only denounced the content of Churchill’s speech, but also 
saw symbolic meaning in his choice of location. The black press pointed out that Missouri 
state law prohibited African Americans from the campus of Westminster College. Churchill 
had addressed a racially exclusive audience at an institution that was a citadel of white 
privilege. His decision to speak at a college that practiced Jim Crow policies underlined the 
connection between the domestic racism of the United States and the overseas exploitation of 
the British.17 
For black political commentators, the prospect of an Anglo-American alliance 
therefore threatened to invert US foreign policy, turning the country from an advocate of 
national sovereignty for all people into an enforcer of imperialist oppression. The United 
States had long been a staunch critic of British imperialism. African Americans feared that an 
Anglo-American alliance would bring about a strategic silence on the part of the British and 
US governments about each other’s racial policies in the interest of maintaining a united front 
against the Soviet Union. As black journalist Roy Ottley asserted, British officials evinced ‘a 
growing appreciation of America’s racial problems, as a kind of quid pro quo for American 
silence about Britain’s racial problems’.18 Sociologist Horace Clayton even claimed that 
Washington had authorised a British diplomatic mission to assess black opinion on its 
imperial policies ‘and to devise means of converting them to the English point of view’. The 
sociologist gave no corroborating evidence, but his claim emphasises the profound mistrust 
of African Americans towards Britain’s intentions.19  
Cayton was not entirely wrong to suspect the British of scheming to protect their 
colonial interests. At almost the same time as his article appeared in the Pittsburgh Courier, 
the British Cabinet determined on a course of action to prevent the United Nations from 
intervening to protect the rights of Indians in South Africa. The strategy focused on 
persuading the American representatives to recognise that such action would set a precedent 
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for possible intercession in their own country’s racial affairs. ‘One such intervention began,’ 
ministers agreed, ‘it would be difficult to set limits to it. Other Governments should see the 
weight of this argument. Thus, the United States Government would hardly welcome 
discussion by the United Nations of the rights of negroes in the United States.’20 
The enthusiasm for the alliance shown by US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, a 
diehard segregationist from South Carolina, compounded African American anxieties that its 
purpose was to perpetuate white global hegemony.21 White southerners were enthusiastic 
supporters of the Special Relationship, which owed not only to the fact that Britain was one 
of the largest markets for their region’s trade exports, but also because of what sociologist 
Alfred Hero described as ‘a sentimental identification with the British’ rooted in a sense of 
common racial ancestry. Churchill’s admiration for Confederate military commanders such 
as Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson strengthened the bond. His determination to preserve 
the British Empire also provided a sense of common cause to segregationists increasingly 
isolated within their own country. In contrast to many northerners who resisted an entangling 
alliance with Britain, the staunch anti-communism of white southerners also encouraged their 
receptiveness to the need for joint diplomatic and military intervention.22 
In denouncing British racism, African Americans focused entirely on the country’s 
colonial policies. Had they been aware of the discrimination suffered by people of colour 
within Britain’s own borders, it would presumably have strengthened their antipathy towards 
Churchill’s vision of a Special Relationship. However, they appear to have been almost 
entirely uninformed about domestic racial politics in Britain. Even NAACP executive 
secretary Walter White, who had served as a war correspondent in Britain during 1944, had 
nothing to say on the matter in his analysis of race issues in the European theatre of war, A 
Rising Wind.23 This ignorance is not surprising given the smallness of the West Indian 
population in Britain, which stood at only 15,000 in 1951. It was only in the wake of the 
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arrival of the first post-war migrants from the Caribbean that African Americans showed any 
awareness of, and interest in, Britain’s non-white population. A letter that W. E. B. Du Bois 
is presumed to have written to Clement Attlee in August 1948 protested the recent rioting 
against black seamen in Liverpool and warned of the damage to Britain’s international 
reputation if those responsible were not arrested, tried and convicted.24 Black journalist Roi 
Ottley also surveyed British race relations as part of a larger study of Europe published in the 
early 1950s. His depressing analysis suggested that while white Britons were outspoken in 
their criticism of American race relations, they were blind to their own prejudices towards the 
migrants newly arrived on their shores.25 For the most part, however, African Americans 
were largely oblivious to the plight of Britain’s black populace. When Paul Robeson, a 
champion of black internationalism, toured Britain in 1949, he upset pioneering civil rights 
organisation the League of Coloured Peoples by ignoring their repeated requests for 
support.26  
Black attitudes towards the Soviet Union also informed reactions to the Fulton 
address. African Americans doubted the sincerity of the speech because they did not believe 
that the Soviet Union endangered global peace and democracy. On the contrary, they 
considered the prospect of an Anglo-American alliance as a gratuitous act of provocation that 
threatened to cause the very conflict Churchill claimed it would prevent. A special 
relationship between Britain and the United States laid the foundations not for a ‘Temple of 
Peace’ as the former prime minister put it but for renewed warfare.27 
At the time of the Fulton speech, the first chills of the Cold War had yet to send a 
shiver to the American people. Few regarded the Soviet Union as a serious threat to the West 
since the country was, in their opinion, focused on national self-recovery. An alliance 
between Britain and the United States would therefore weaken rather than strengthen global 
security by unnecessarily antagonising the Soviets. The African American press shared these 
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opinions, asserting that the Soviet Union represented no challenge even to the furthest 
defensive outposts of the United States and, in an articulation of their commitment to the new 
internationalism that they believed would bring lasting world peace, that any tensions 
between the two nations should be resolved through the newly constituted United Nations.28 
According to the Chicago Defender, the Fulton speech was little short of a casus belli. An 
alliance formed in opposition to the Soviet Union would have catastrophic consequences, 
rendering ‘World War III…a certainty’. African American congressman Adam Clayton 
Powell similarly regarded the concept of a Special Relationship as ‘a form of super-
nationalism based on race’ that would not only antagonise the Soviet Union but also grant it 
permanent superiority over the West by attracting millions of people of colour living under 
British colonial rule to the communist cause.29 
 The Soviet Union had a powerful pull on the collective imagination of African 
Americans themselves. As black journalist George McCray observed, ‘In the minds of most 
Negroes there is a small soft spot for Russia because most of us believe the Russians do not 
believe in nor practice racial discrimination.’30 In contrast to most white Americans, African 
Americans therefore saw the Soviet Union not only in less negative terms than Churchill, but 
also positively praised the country for its supposed colour-blindness. African American 
artistic and cultural luminaries, including the author Langston Hughes and most prominently 
the actor and singer Paul Robeson, eulogised the racial inclusiveness and progressivism of the 
Soviet Union, which they contrasted with the discriminatory colonial practices of the British 
and domestic policies of their own government.31 The warm disposition of many African 
American political commentators towards the Soviet Union accounts for their widespread 
approval of Stalin’s denunciation of the Fulton speech.32 
 Even those African Americans who were more circumspect in their appraisal of the 
Soviet Union considered Churchill a hypocrite for denouncing its supposed tyranny while his 
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own country denied democratic rights to millions of colonial subjects around the world. In 
contrast to the effusive praise bestowed on the Soviet Union by the likes of W. E. B. Du Bois 
and Paul Robeson, sociologist Horace R. Cayton observed that ‘nobody, especially Russia, is 
under any illusions about the real essence of democracy in Russia. It just doesn’t exist in the 
sense that we know it.’ According to Cayton, the Soviets made no pretence to protecting and 
promoting human rights such as the freedoms of speech, press or assembly. Nor, however, 
did they discriminate between and against citizens because of their skin colour. Rather, ‘they 
have worked out a formula for seeing that all peoples in spite of color or race get just about 
an equal break’. By contrast, the racist policies of Britain and the United States belied their 
rhetorical claims to champion peace and democracy.33 An editorial in the New Journal and 
Guide likewise concluded that while Churchill warned against Soviet expansionism, ‘any 
examination of Great Britain’s foreign policy and the execution and administration of her 
colonial policy will reveal that some of the methods now being utilized by the Soviets are 
puny by comparison.’ The Russian bear was far from tame, but the British lion was still the 
fiercer predator.34 
Although Churchill was the particular focus of their anger and distrust, African 
Americans opposed an alliance with Britain regardless of who ran its government. Britain’s 
wartime leader was no longer prime minister by the time he delivered the Fulton speech. The 
election of a Labour administration led by Clement Attlee in July 1945 initially gave hope to 
African Americans that Britain would belatedly extend the Atlantic Charter beyond Europe to 
secure national self-determination for its imperial subjects. However, this initial optimism 
soon turned to bitter disappointment. 
African American leaders’ early encounters with the Labour Party had not proven 
especially encouraging. When Walter White and W. E. B. Du Bois travelled to London to 
attend the second Pan African Congress in 1921, they also arranged a meeting with Labour’s 
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National Executive Committee. Their efforts to secure a clear statement in support of 
ameliorating the worst conditions of colonial rule ended in failure, Labour leader Ramsay 
MacDonald parrying the African Americans’ intellectual punches with ‘vague evasions’. 
Labour members were also apparently reluctant to speak out against racial discrimination in 
the United States for fear it would provoke the American government intervention on the 
Irish question.35 
Labour’s surprise post-war election victory nonetheless kindled renewed optimism 
among African Americans for the rapid restoration of self-rule to Britain’s colonies. This 
expectation owed substantially to wartime statements made by Clement Attlee in which, 
contrastingly with Churchill, he had endorsed the universal application of the Atlantic 
Charter. In an address widely reported by the African American press, the Labour leader had 
informed the West African Students’ Union that the freedoms for which Allied forces were 
fighting were for the benefit of all people, regardless of race.36 Attlee’s accession to the 
British premiership therefore aroused much excitement and anticipation on the part of 
African American commentators. ‘To the common men of the world, to 750,000,000 
exploited and underprivileged black and brown peoples in European colonies,’ proclaimed 
the Chicago Defender, ‘the Labor victory may mean the lifting of the longest blackout of 
freedom ever imposed in an Empire. It is the most hopeful promise to come out of this war.’ 
Retaining the parallel between British colonialism and American racism, the newspaper 
expressed its hope that Attlee’s election represented the end of ‘Jim Crow with a cockney 
accent’.37 Enthusiasm for the new administration remained strong when the Afro-American 
reported from the Labour Party Conference in Bournemouth the following summer, praising 
rank-and-file members for loudly repudiating both British imperialism and an Anglo-
American alliance against the Soviet Union.38 
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The sweet promise of Labour’s election victory nonetheless soon turned to sour 
disillusionment. African Americans were particularly critical of the Attlee government’s 
reluctance to yield to American pressure to resettle tens of thousands of Jewish refugees in 
Palestine. African Americans had since the 1930s drawn parallels between their own plight 
and that of the Jewish victims of Nazi oppression, which made them strong proponents of 
resettlement. The outspoken resistance of Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin therefore drew the 
fire of African American editorial writers. His claim that Americans supported resettlement 
because they did not want any more Jews in New York elicited indignant comparisons with 
Hitler. As one editorial asserted, Bevin was ‘a rowdy who speaks gutter-snipe billingsgate to 
propagate anti-semitism and to slur one of the many peoples which are America’s glory’.39 
The African American press also reacted angrily to reports that the Labour 
government was actually attempting to aggrandise Britain’s overseas empire. Black 
newspapers condemned a proposal from Bevin to annex the Ethiopian region of Ogaden, 
under military control since the defeat of Italian forces during the war, to a united Somali 
state governed by British colonial administrators.40 Although Britain abandoned the plan in 
the face of opposition from Washington, the African American press continued to report 
regularly on the suppression of nationalist uprisings in other parts of the British Empire, 
which it regarded as a betrayal of Attlee’s wartime rhetoric.41 Although the Prime Minister 
eventually received praise for securing Indian independence in 1947, the black press 
condemned the new public works programme instituted to improve its economy as coming 
‘close to a system of slave labor’.42 
The failure of the Labour government to fulfil African Americans’ expectations 
convinced them that the British were all, regardless of party political affiliation, 
untrustworthy imperialists. As the Cleveland Call and Post concluded, ‘They do not intend to 
give in one inch in granting improved citizenship to these people unless they are absolutely 
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forced to do so.’43 The Chicago Defender was even more acidic in its evaluation of the Attlee 
administration. ‘The Labor Party may be Socialist at home,’ it opined, ‘but they, like 
Churchill, are Tories abroad.’44  
 This mistrust of the entire Westminster establishment fuelled African Americans’ 
fervent resistance to the proposed financial loan to Britain because they believed Labour as 
much as the Conservatives would use it not only to rebuild the country’s war-shattered 
economy, but also to buttress its otherwise unaffordable empire. In contrast to conservative 
whites, who feared that the Attlee administration would use American dollars to nationalise 
private industry, African Americans were enthusiastic about the Labour government’s 
experiment in democratic socialism. It was one thing to improve the material condition of the 
British people through the creation of a welfare state, but another altogether to secure their 
renewed prosperity through the further exploitation of the colonies. The NAACP lobbied 
Washington to impose the condition that the British government would not use a loan to 
sustain its faltering colonial administrations.45 Mistrust of how the British government would 
spend the loan led other African Americans to oppose financial support outright. 
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell deplored the prospect of the United States paying to 
prop up the British Empire from the floor of the House of Representatives.46 Black 
newspapers applied further pressure. ‘Should We Lend Billions For This?’ asked a Chicago 
Defender editorial on the British Empire which answered its own question with a resounding 
no. Correspondent Clifford W. Smith was even more emphatic. In language analogous with 
that of reactionary whites, he declared that, ‘Every red blooded American should put forth 
every effort to defeat the proposed…loan that is coming up soon for debate in both the House 
of Representatives and the Senate.’47 Associated Negro Press journalist Dean Gordon B. 
Hancock concurred, claiming that it would be better to let burn Britain’s ‘international 
chestnuts we are pulling out of the fire’.48 
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African Americans were also unenthusiastic about the Marshall Plan, regarding the 
reconstruction of the war torn economies of Western Europe, including Britain, as less of a 
government priority than remedying racial problems closer to home. It would be far better to 
invest the money, claimed one newspaper, in building a modern infrastructure for the 
impoverished black population of the US Virgin Islands.49 Opinion polls conducted in the late 
1940s consistently demonstrated a lack of popular support in the United States for further 
financial support to Britain. African Americans expressed more implacable opposition than 
any other element of the population. An American Institute of Public Opinion poll in 1949 
found that only 14 per cent of white citizens favoured any additional loan to Britain. The 
figure for African Americans was only one in ten.50 
For all their antipathy towards Britain as an imperial tyrant, there was nonetheless 
another perception of the country that had long held a powerful hold on African Americans’ 
collective imagination. This was of a progressive nation that had for more than a century been 
one of the most trenchant international critics of American racism. That reputation had lured 
black activists to its shores in the expectation of enlisting powerful support for their cause: 
first abolitionists such as Frederick Douglass and William Wells Brown during the 1840s and 
then the anti-lynching campaigner Ida B. Wells in the 1890s.51 Within the lifetimes of 
contemporary African American activists, British citizens had taken to the streets of London 
in a show of solidarity with the Scottsboro Boys, nine black teenagers accused of raping two 
white women in Alabama.52 Most recently of all, the British people had defied not only the 
high command of the US army, but also their own government, in treating African American 
GIs with dignity and respect during the Second World War. (Black newspapers unfortunately 
provide little insight into the attitude of African American veterans towards the Special 
Relationship, an important area for future research.) 53 
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No one articulated this sense of transatlantic solidarity between ordinary Britons and 
African Americans more eloquently than performing artist and political activist Paul 
Robeson. For a time during the 1930s, he had made Britain his home. There he had 
developed a potent kinship with the country’s white working class that contrasted with his 
scathing criticism of the imperial policies pursued by its political elite. ‘If in Britain there 
were those who lived by plundering the colonial peoples,’ he later wrote, ‘there were also the 
many millions who earned their bread by honest toil. And even as I grew to feel more Negro 
in spirit, or African as I put it then, I also came to feel a sense of oneness with the white 
working people whom I came to know and love.’54 
The closeness of political elites in London and Washington threatened the capacity of 
these ordinary Britons to speak out against American racism. Black activists worried that 
Britain’s increasing reliance on American financial and military support would curtail 
progressive criticism of Jim Crow racism. The more liberal elements of British society would 
better serve the civil rights cause if their country avoided an alliance with the United States. 
As journalist George Padmore proclaimed, ‘Ever since Britain’s economic dependence upon 
the United States for loans on the one hand, and military reliance in the event of a third 
World War on the other hand, the Labor Government has discouraged the press of this 
country openly criticizing America’s shameful and disgraceful treatment of her colored 
population.’55 Roi Ottley expressed the same sentiment that British reliance on the United 
States compromised criticism of African Americans’ oppression. Britons ‘would undoubtedly 
confront America with the ludicrous role she often plays, posturing about “democracy” and 
“freedom,”’ if they ‘did not so urgently need American dollars, diplomatic and military 
cooperation’.56 
Ottley and Padmore were right to believe that the British dared not bite the hand that 
fed. The Attlee administration declined numerous representations from African American 
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activists to lobby Washington on their behalf.57 A memorandum issued to British Embassy 
officials in Washington during October 1945 instructed that, ‘We should not in public make 
comparisons with the U.S. or critical reference to U.S. domestic affairs, or take sides in 
domestic political issues; nor should we become involved in controversy on racial and 
religious subjects.’58 
African Americans never evinced the same level of support for the Special 
Relationship as the wider US population. In August 1949, the American Institute of Public 
Opinion conducted a poll that asked whether it made much difference to the United States 
whether Britain remained a strong nation. Sixty-six per cent of white respondents answered 
yes, compared to 55 per cent of African Americans.59  
The fact that more than half of those black people polled responded positively 
nonetheless represented a substantial shift in opinion and a closing of the divide with white 
attitudes. Several factors account for this stronger commitment to the Anglo-American 
alliance. The first was the onset of the Cold War. As relations between the United States and 
the Soviet Union deteriorated from an autumnal chill to a wintry freeze, African Americans 
embraced the cold war consensus. A loss of faith in communism as a colour-blind alternative 
to western capitalism led many African Americans to support a western containment policy 
against Soviet incursion into the African continent. For African Americans who retained their 
leftist radicalism, the intensification of the domestic cold war also made it politically 
expedient to temper criticism of US foreign policy. Black militants under suspicion by their 
own government needed to soften their supranational identity as members of the African 
diaspora and instead emphasise their patriotic loyalty to the United States. 
Positive action by the British also disposed African Americans more favourably 
towards the Special Relationship. Albeit begrudging, the black press did concede that the 
Attlee government had made positive advances towards decolonisation. Another factor was 
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that while the British establishment continued to curtail criticism of American race relations, 
progressive voices penetrated this official silence to speak out in support of black civil rights. 
British citizens mobilized grassroots opposition to some of the most egregious acts of 
American racial injustice. One particular cause célèbre was a sentence of death by electric 
chair passed down by a Mississippi court in January 1947 on two black teenagers, James 
Lewis and Charles Trudell, found guilty of murdering their white employer. Hundreds of 
British citizens petitioned the US embassy in Grosvenor Square for clemency. Compounding 
their moral outrage was an angry resentment at what they regarded as the double standards of 
a country that criticised British imperial rule while oppressing its own minority populations. 
As one respondent to the Mass Observation social research organisation, which recorded the 
opinions of everyday people, exclaimed: ‘The Americans laugh at our Imperialism but they 
should look at their own democracy with its colour bar. Two fourteen year old black boys 
were sentenced to death, and they talk.’ Labour MPs Richard Crossman and Tom Driberg 
also telegrammed President Truman, urging him to intervene in order to ‘protect basic human 
rights’, a phrase that denoted Britain honouring rather than undermining the new 
internationalist framework of governance established through the United Nations.60 White 
Britons also championed the cause of the Trenton Six, black defendants sentenced to death 
for the murder of a white shopkeeper. In May 1949, Paul Robeson performed a concert at the 
New International Club in Manchester’s Moss Side to raise funds for their defence. Liberal 
Britons also established a committee to protest travel restrictions imposed on Robeson by the 
US government.61  
These actions contributed to a reassessment of the United States’ relationship with 
Britain. In September 1949, the Kansas City Plaindealer published ‘A Plea for 
Understanding’, in which it attempted to reeducate its readership about the virtues of an 
Anglo-American alliance. ‘We are more critical of Britain than we are of any other nation,’ 
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the article began in a manner familiar to readers only to off-balance them by continuing, ‘just 
in the same way as we are more critical of our families than of our friends’. Britain, the 
newspaper proclaimed, was a force for good in the world. First, long before the United States 
intervened in the Second World War, it had endured terrible deprivation as it stood alone in 
the fight against fascism; now it was also an ally in another conflict to defend democracy, this 
time from communism. ‘Anglo-American understanding is more than something we should 
merely want, or something for which, merely in our spare time we ought to work. It is an 
essential to our way of life—for whether we like it or not, no other country is as close to our 
ideals and our fundamental beliefs in the sanctity of the individual and the responsibility of 
government to the people.’ Winston Churchill could not have been more pleased with the 
article if he had written it himself.62 
The Anglophobia of the late 1940s had not entirely receded. Many African Americans 
retained an ambivalent attitude towards their country’s transatlantic ally. The increasingly 
desperate efforts of the British government to preserve its crumbling empire continued to 
draw fire from African Americans during the post-war era. The US government opposed 
British and French over Suez in 1956, but African Americans expressed a particularly strong 
and instinctive support for Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. NAACP executive 
secretary Roy Wilkins used his speech at the organisation’s annual convention in San 
Francisco to celebrate British and French defeat in Egypt, which had taken the world a step 
further towards ‘rooting out the apostles of white supremacy’.63   
African Americans also never forgave Churchill for what they saw as his attempt to 
sustain a white imperialist world order through a diplomatic and military alliance between 
Britain and the United States. This included their opposition to John F. Kennedy bestowing 
the former prime minister with honorary US citizenship while he was still alive and to the 
unveiling of a commemorative statue in Washington after he was dead. Obituaries of the late 
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prime minister praised his many talents as a statesman but still stressed that his stubborn 
refusal to recognise the basic rights of people of colour around the world. As the Chicago 
Defender concluded, ‘Despite his brilliance and universalism, he saw the world only in the 
perspective of advancing white civilization.’64 Almost a decade later, the same newspaper 
published an article ‘We remember Churchill’. It was not fondly. Focusing on his efforts to 
form an Anglo-American alliance, it concluded: ‘Africa and the rest of the black world have 
no apology to make for not bowing in tribute to Winston Churchill, the great white Father 
whose power and gift of oratory we acknowledge, but whose constricted field of vision and 
lack of concern for those struggling to be free, we deplore. To have followed the white world 
in its inordinate adulations would have been an indecent, intolerable display of hypocrisy.’65 
Yet African American dislike of Churchill should not obscure the fact that differences 
over race relations between Britons and Americans created a lasting fault-line within the 
post-war Special Relationship. Opinion polls conducted in the 1950s showed that Britain was 
one of the most trenchant international critics of American race relations.66 British 
commentators emphasised not only the ethical dimension of the civil rights cause, but also a 
strategic concern that the United States had compromised the containment of communist 
expansion by allowing the practice of racial discrimination to tarnish its position as leader of 
the free world. Others continued to bristle at American criticism of British colonial rule, 
claiming that the persistence of Jim Crow denied the United States any claim to the moral 
high ground.67  
A new development complicated matters further. On 22 June 1948, the MV Empire 
Windrush arrived at Tilbury docks with 492 Jamaican passengers aboard. The migration of 
tens of thousands of people from Britain’s colonies to the Mother Country had a profound 
influence on the transatlantic dialogue about race. Black people on both sides of the Atlantic 
came to see themselves as allies in a larger global resistance movement against white 
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supremacy, trading activists, tactics and publicity. African Americans therefore became 
partners in an alternative Anglo-American alliance, one based on shared racial identity but 
with the purpose to pull down rather than prop up the existing order. This expression of 
transnational racial solidarity demonstrates that within the broader context of transatlantic 
relations there was not one but many Special Relationships.68 
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